The comfortable view in Tokyo, Canberra and even in Beijing that Trump in election mode was all political rhetoric, and that U.S. global economic and security strategies would largely remain undisturbed, has given way to deeper disquiet. In Asia, it may mean an effort to balance with Russian Federation against China – the reverse of US China approach in the 1970s.
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In Asia, that may translate to a double pivot.
Trump made trade relations a central theme of his election campaign, maintaining that the USA was getting a raw deal from agreements ranging from Nafta to the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
This would matter for any incoming administration, but matters especially for the Trump administration, which has telegraphed its intention to go head-to-head with China along several fronts – most notably over Taiwan and the One China policy, and trade policy.
Lu Kang, right, talks with Richard Engel of NBC News in Beijing on January 24. “Trade wars, retaliatory tariffs and barriers to free movement of people and trade can cause turbulence in global markets”, said Ajay Bodke, CEO and chief portfolio manager, PMS at Prabhudas Lilladher. It is also the world’s second-largest economy and the target of Trump accusations it is stealing American jobs. But like Mr Trump’s threats on trade, Mr Tillerson’s comments also reflect a dangerously inflated sense of United States leverage: it is not 1953 any more. Just three days before, US Commerce Secretary nominee Wilbur Ross at his confirmation hearing attacked overcapacity in the Chinese steel industry, and hinted that the US may impose anti-dumping and countervailing duties on Chinese steel and aluminum exports.
He’s promised to slap a 45% tax on Chinese imports if Beijing doesn’t start playing fair – a move that’s led to concerns over a US-China trade war. Moreover, these statements have unsettled USA friends and allies in Asia – particularly those who fear getting caught between two “fighting” elephants. That effort, however, may have to cope with Trump’s double pivot.
After rounds of secret talks, then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew signed an agreement with president Chiang Ching-kuo of Taiwan in 1975 under which “Project Starlight” was launched.
One way for the allies to balance China positively is to help build a strong, stable, and prosperous Southeast Asia along China’s periphery that is relatively open and able to cooperate effectively to protect shared interests. No war can be one-sided.
China is waiting to see what Trump decides to do. And as Sourabh Gupta of the Institute for China-America Studies poses: “What if other states enact a similar policy, i.e., they agree to respect US claims only if the USA respects their claims?”
But none of these incoming leaders’ statements – including Tillerson’s – have been clarified or “walked-back” and another official authorized to speak on behalf of the transition team said Tillerson “did not misspeak”. Any forceful effort of the U.S. to circle one or all the islands would result in an open conflict with China, which is not in the U.S. interest.
As Asia business correspondent for BBC World News, I have been monitoring and analysing Mr Donald Trump’s rise to power very closely. “Trump will do everything he can to push China to give concessions”. “On its current trajectory, the Asia Pacific regional order risks fracturing into a two-tiered structure comprised of the US-led liberal worldwide order and an emerging Chinese sphere of influence”. “But in the future, it would be the other way around”, he added.
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What are the likely effects on U.S.
